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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Theft by Deception, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999), Identity Fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002), and Forgery, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden, Judge, presiding.1 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Under section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code, a criminal defendant may not be 
1
 A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is attached in 
Addendum A. 
convicted of both a principal crime and lesser-included offenses. Nevertheless, the 
defendant in this case was convicted of both the principal crime of theft by deception, and 
the lesser-included offenses of identity fraud and forgery. May the convictions for 
identity fraud and forgery be sustained? 
Standard of Review: The issue in this case revolves around the interpretation of the theft 
by deception, identity fraud, and forgery statutes. The inteipretation of these statutes is a 
legal analysis that involves no questions of fact. Therefore, this Court reviews "the trial 
court's ruling[s] for correctness and gives no deference to its conclusions."2 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 173 [98-111]. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative on appeal: 
Section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code, "Included Offenses," which is provided in 
Addendum B. 
Section 76-6-405 of the Utah Code, "Theft by Deception," which provides: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property 
of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity 
as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements 
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" 
means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications 
addressed to the public or to a class or group. 
2
 State v. VigiL 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992). See also State v. Casev. 2001 UT App 
205,116, 29 P.2d 25. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999). 
Section 76-6-1102 of the Utah Code, "Identity Fraud Crime," which is provided in 
Addendum C. 
Section 76-6-501 of the Utah Code, "Forgery," which is provided in Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 21, 2001 Appellant Kevin Chukes was charged by information with 
theft by deception, identity fraud, and forgery. R. 2-5. He pled not-guilty to the crimes, 
and a preliminary hearing was held. R. 29. At the hearing, the court found probable cause 
to believe that Mr. Chukes had committed the crimes and he was bound over for trial. R. 
172 [21]. 
The trial was held and evidence was presented. R. 173 [13-90]. After all of the 
evidence was submitted, the defense counsel objected to the fact that Mr. Chukes had 
been charged with three separate criminal counts for the same act. R. 173 [99-101]. The 
defense counsel pointed out that, because Mr. Chukes committed only one criminal act he 
should be convicted of only one crime. R. 173 [110-11]. What is more, two of the 
charges, identity fraud and forgery, are lesser-included offenses of theft by deception as a 
matter of law. Id. However, the court disagreed with these arguments and overruled the 
objection. Id. at 107-12. 
Mr. Chukes was convicted as charged. R. 115-17. He filed a timely notice of 
appeal. R. 159-60. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Clark Grimshaw, the manager of Crown Bedrooms in Murray, sells heirloom-
quality bedroom furniture for a living. R. 173 [14]. He was working in his store on the 
morning of March 1, 2001, when a man who was neatly-dressed and well-spoken entered. 
Id at 16. The man was interested in one of the bedroom sets in the display windows. Id. 
at 18. He asked several questions about the furniture. Id In particular, he wanted to know 
whether delivery was available that day. Id. Mr. Grimshaw said that the man "was in 
some sort of a dilemma that it would solve for him if he made a purchase on that given 
day." Id. However, delivery was not available that day, and the set was not currently in 
stock. Id. at 21. Nevertheless, Mr. Grimshaw offered to sell the man the display model if 
he could make his own delivery arrangements. Id. at 21. The man agreed. Id. 
The furniture cost nearly $6,000. Id. at 22; Evid. Env. Ex. 3. It included a bed 
priced at $1,500, a mattress priced at $600, a comforter priced at $500, a dresser and 
mirror at $2,000, and a vanity at $1,700. R. 173 [22]; Evid. Env. Ex. 3. Mr. Grimshaw 
asked the man how he wished to pay for the furniture, and the man said he wanted to 
finance it. R. 173 [23]. Mr. Grimshaw gave him a blank credit application and watched 
him fill it out. IdL at 24. The man gave his name as "Jeffery Mewborn," and filled out the 
blanks for his social security number, driver's license number, and present and previous 
addresses.3 Mr. Grimshaw watched him sign the application. R. 173 [24]. 
3
 Evid. Env. Ex. 2. During Mr. Grimshaw's testimony, the prosecutor referred to the 
credit application as "exhibit 1." R. 173 [25-26]. However, the application is marked "exhibit 2" 
in the evidence envelope. Evid. Env. Ex. 2. Apparently, the prosecutor either misnumbered the 
4 
Mr. Grimshaw took the application and explained to the man that he would fax it 
to the store's financier, American General, and American General would respond within 
five to ten minutes. Id at 25-26. The man replied that he was in a hurry and had to leave. 
Id. at 26-27. However, he assured Mr. Grimshaw that he would call the store later to see 
whether the application had been accepted. Id. 
The man called half an hour later. Id. at 29. Mr. Grimshaw told him the application 
had been accepted. Id at 29-30. Mr. Grimshaw also asked when he would be picking up 
the furniture. Id at 30. The man replied that he would pick it up as soon as he could. Id. 
The man arrived a little after three that afternoon and said that someone would be 
coming with a moving van. Id at 31. While they were waiting, Mr. Grimshaw showed the 
man the credit contract, which listed the amount of money financed, the finance charge, 
and the monthly payment amount. Id, Evid. Env. Ex. 1. The man signed the contract as 
"Jeffery Mewborn." Evid. Env. Ex. 1. 
Soon after, a young woman arrived driving a moving van. R. 173 [37]. Mr. 
Grimshaw and another salesman helped the man carry the furniture out to the van. Id. 37-
38. Then the man and woman drove away. Id at 39-40. 
Within days, Mr. Grimshaw discovered that the man was not Mr. Mewbom, and 
that the sale was not legitimate. Ld at 40. The police began an investigation, and asked 
Mr. Grimshaw to describe the man who had represented himself as Mr. Mewborn. Id Mr. 
exhibits or referred to the wrong numbers by mistake. Later, the court clarified that the credit 
application was actually labeled "exhibit 2" and the credit contract was labeled "exhibit 1." R. 
173 [33]. Both exhibits were admitted without objection. Id. 
5 
Grimshaw provided a description. Id. Later, and the police asked him to look at a photo 
line-up. Id. at 40-41. A detective prepared the line-up and showed it to Mr. Grimshaw. Id. 
at 79-80. Mr. Grimshaw identified Mr. Chukes as the man who had pretended to be Mr. 
Mewbom.lcL at 82-83. 
At trial, the authentic Mr. Mewborn appeared and testified that he did not know 
Mr. Chukes, had not given Mr. Chukes his personal information, and had not given Mr. 
Chukes permission to use the information. Id, at 68-69. He also testified that the 
signatures on the credit and sales documents were not his, IcL at 69-70, and that he had 
never been to Crown Bedrooms nor purchased anything there. Id. at 67-68. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The theft by deception conviction is the only conviction that should be affirmed in 
this case. The other two convictions, forgery and identity fraud, should be vacated for two 
reasons. First, they are lesser-included offenses as a matter of law. Second, they are not 
independently supported by the evidence. 
With regard to the first argument, forgery is a lesser-included offense of both 
identity fraud and theft by deception because all of the forgery elements are encompassed 
by identity fraud and theft by deception. So, forgery merges into those crimes. Further, 
identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception, and so it merges into theft 
by deception. Accordingly, only the theft by deception conviction remains standing. 
Second, the forgery and identity fraud convictions should be vacated because they 
6 
are supported by the same evidence that supports the theft by deception conviction. 
Indeed, there is not one fact supporting forgery and identity fraud that is not necessary to 
support the theft by deception conviction. And, each conviction must be supported by at 
least some independent evidence. Otherwise, the convictions violate section 76-1-402 of 
the Utah Code, which prohibits multiple convictions for the same act. In short, the forgery 
and identity fraud convictions are superfluous and should be vacated, leaving only the 
theft by deception conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
MR, CHUKES' CONVICTION ON ALL THREE COUNTS CHARGED IS 
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE FORGERY AND IDENTITY FRAUD MERGE. 
LEAVING ONLY THEFT BY DECEPTION STANDING 
Mr. Chukes committed only one crime. He stole furniture from Crown Bedrooms 
by pretending to be Mr. Mewborn, whose credit was acceptable to the store. This is a 
punishable crime, but it should not be punished more than once. It was committed with 
one purpose, obtaining the furniture, by one method, pretending to be Mr. Mewborn. 
Nothing else happened. Without more, the evidence simply is not enough to support three 
separate criminal convictions. 
More to the point, two of the crimes, identification fraud and forgery, are lesser-
included offenses of the theft by deception. A criminal defendant cannot be convicted of 
both a primary crime and lesser-included offenses. The fact-finder must chose between 
them. That did not happen in this case. Instead, Mr. Chukes' was convicted of all three 
7 
crimes. This is illegal, and it compels a vacation of the identity fraud and forgery charges. 
This is demonstrated by the law. The double jeopardy clauses of the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution prohibit a conviction for both a principal crime 
and lesser-included offenses. State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Flowing from the double jeopardy clauses is section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code, which 
explains the guidelines for determining when offenses are lesser-included. Under that 
section, an offense is a lesser-included if "[i]t is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the [principal] offense 
charged."4 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999). It is generally accepted that this statute 
originated with the double jeopardy provisions. Ross. 951 P.2d at 241. However, these 
provisions are not the only source of lesser-included jurisprudence. The due process and equal 
protection provisions also contribute. 
Interestingly, while the due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy clauses all 
contribute, they are applied in different circumstances with slightly different results. The due 
process clause, for instance, is applied when the prosecution seeks to instruct the jury on a 
lesser-included offense that was not charged in the Information, In this situation, the principal 
crime must be closely compared with the lesser-included to determine whether the lesser-
included is necessarily proven by proof of the principal. State v, Carruth. 1999 UT 107, ^ [6; 993 
P.2d 869. This stringent procedure is necessary because the due process clause protects a 
criminal defendant's right to know the charges against him, and adding an additional charge 
during trial may violate this right. Id at ^ [6-7. Notably, the procedure is not as stringent when it 
is the defendant who requests an instruction on a lesser-included offense. In such circumstances 
an instruction on a lesser-included offense may be given if there is any basis for it in the 
evidence. Beck v. Alabama. 447 U.S. 625,635-37 (1980); State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 157-58 
(Utah 1983). 
Under the equal protection clause, the lesser-included offense principal has been treated 
differently. This is because the equal protection clause does not focus on the defendant's right to 
know the charges against him, but on the idea that similarly-situated persons must be treated 
alike. State v. Shondeh 453 P.2d 146,147 (Utah 1969). Accordingly, where acts are punishable 
under two separate statutory provisions, only one provision may be applied. State v. Garmbrell 
8 
In interpreting this section, Utah courts have applied a two-tiered analysis to 
identify lesser-included offenses. First, the statutory elements of the crimes are compared. 
State v. Hill 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983). If one crime "is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission" of another, then the 
crime is a lesser-included offense of the other. Id. (citation omitted). The lesser-included 
relationship has been established between crimes such as robbery and theft,5 
communications fraud and forgery,6 kidnaping and false imprisonment,7 larceny and false 
pretenses,8 joyriding and vehicle theft,9 and possession of a stolen vehicle and vehicle 
theft.10 
The second tier of the test involves the facts actually proven at trial. These facts 
814 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Usually, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the 
more lenient statute. ShondeL 453 P.2d at 148. 
In this case, neither the due process nor equal protection theories fit. Due process does 
not fit because the three charges at issue were all named in the information, and Mr. Chukes was 
given notice of them. Likewise, equal protection does not fit because the charges do not punish 
similar conduct. They punish graduated conduct. In other words, forgery is necessarily proven by 
proof of identity fraud and theft by deception, and identity fraud is necessarily proven by proof 
of theft by deception. And so the double jeopardy theory, which prohibits multiple punishments 
for the same act, is the constitutional provision applicable in this case. 
5
 Hill, 674 P.2d at 97-98. 
6
 Ross, 951 P.2d at 241-242. 
7
 State v. Olsen. 289 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1930). 
8
 State v. Sevmour. 163 P. 789, 791-92 (Utah 1917). 
9
 State v. Llovd. 568 P.2d 356,358 (Utah 1977). 
10
 State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460,462-63 (Utah 1990). 
9 
become significant when the crimes involved have multiple variations. In this case the 
crimes involved, theft by deception, identity fraud, and forgery, have multiple variations. 
And so it must be determined whether the greater-lesser relationship actually exists 
between the variations of these crimes proved at trial Hill 674 P.2d at 97. 
The three subsections below apply the two-tiered test to the charges at issue and 
the facts of this case. In the first subsection, the statutory elements of the charges are 
compared to show that forgery is a lesser-included offense of both identity fraud and theft 
by deception. In the second subsection, the statutory elements are compared to show that 
identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception. In the third subsection, 
the evidence supporting the proven variations of these three crimes is analyzed to show 
that the same facts support all three charges. Overall, these arguments demonstrate that 
Mr. Chukes should have been convicted of only one crime, theft by deception. The other 
two crimes, identity fraud and forgery, are lesser-included offenses and should be 
reversed. 
A. The Elements of Forgery are Included in Identity Fraud and Theft bv 
Deception 
Theft by deception should be the only conviction affirmed in this case. That is 
because forgery merges into both identity fraud and theft by deception, and identity fraud 
merges into theft by deception. This is demonstrated by a comparison of the elements of 
the crimes. 
10 
First, the elements of forgery will be compared with those of identity fraud to 
show that forgery is a lesser-included offense of identity fraud. The elements of forgery 
are: 
(1) intentionally or knowingly; 
(2) issuing or uttering a writing; 
(3) purporting to be the act of another; 
(4) with the purpose to defraud. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). Although this is a complete list of all of the statutory 
elements, the trial court added other elements into the jury instructions. Those elements 
are that the writing or utterance must not have been the act of the person whose name was 
forged. R. 91. Also, the writing or utterance must not have been authorized. Id And, the 
defendant must have known that his act was unauthorized. LI 
The trial court should not have added these extra elements to the jury instructions. 
They do not explain the law under any variation of the crime of forgery,11 nor do they 
explain any part of the statutory elements.12 Because of that, their inclusion was error. As 
this Court has held, jury instructions "must accurately and adequately inform a criminal 
jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged." State v. Larsen. 876 P.2d 391, 396 
11
 If there are multiple variations of a crime, the jury may be instructed on the variation 
most applicable to the case. State v. Roth. 2001 UT 103,1(10; 37 P.3d 1099. 
12
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (neither the lack of authorization nor the 
knowledge of it is mentioned or implied in the statute, with the exception of the "altering a 
writing" form of forgery, which is not at issue here). 
11 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). What is more, the instructions may not comment on the evidence 
or overemphasize any point of the case. State v. Clayton. 6464 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 
1982); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure. § 463 (13th ed. 1992). Here, the 
court's extra instructions, particularly those concerning the victim's lack of authorization, 
amount to commentary on the evidence and an overemphasis of the fact that Mr. Chukes 
did not have Mr. Mewborn's permission to use his information. This is inappropriate. It is 
also unnecessary since the lack of authorization is taken into account in the legitimate 
forgery instructions. And so, the trial court should not have added the extra instructions. 
However, Mr. Chukes does not contest these extra instructions because, even with 
them, the forgery elements are fully included in the elements of identity fraud. A person 
commits identity fraud when he: 
(1) knowingly or intentionally; 
(2) obtains personal identifying information of another person; 
(3) without that person's authorization; 
(4) and the defendant uses, or attempts to use that information with fraudulent 
intent, such as to obtain credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value; 
(5) and the value of the credit, goods, services, or other thing of value exceeds 
$5,000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002); R. 88. 
As this comparison of forgery and identity fraud shows, all of the elements of 
forgery are included in identity fraud. Both crimes have the same intent element, which is 
12 
the "knowingly or intentionally" intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1) (1999); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2) (Supp. 2002). Both crimes require that the defendant act with 
a purpose to defraud. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
1102(2)(b) (Supp. 2002). And, both crimes require the unauthorized use of another's 
name, personal identification, or identity. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(1) & (2) (Supp. 2002). 
In those areas where the elements of the two crimes are not precise matches, the 
identity fraud elements are broader and include the elements of forgery. For one thing, the 
forgery elements of "making a writing or uttering" that is "purported to be that of 
another" is included in the identity fraud statute. These forgery elements are statutorily 
described as: 
any writing of another [made] without his authority, [or] any such altered 
writing; or [the making, completing, executing, authenticating, issuing, 
transferring, publishing, or uttering of] any writing so that the writing or the 
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the 
person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a 
time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or 
to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (l)(a) & (b) (1999). This is a broad range of activity, but the 
identity fraud statute covers it all by simply saying that identity fraud is committed when 
the defendant uses, in any way, the personal identifying information of another. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp. 2002). 
While it is true that the forgery statute indicates that a forger may purport to be 
13 
either an existent or nonexistent person, and the identity fraud statute deals only with 
existent persons, there is still a greater-lesser relationship between these two crimes in 
this case. This is because, in this case, the person Mr. Chukes pretended to be was Mr. 
Mewborn, not a nonexistent person. Evid. Env. Ex. 1 & 2. And so, under the evidence 
proved at trial and the prosecution's theory of this case, R. 173 [141-42], the forgery and 
identity fraud statutes are the same. 
The analysis above covers all of the elements of forgery. Beyond this, the crime of 
identity fraud has a few more elements. For instance, identity fraud requires that the 
defendant use another's personal information to obtain or attempt to obtain "credit goods, 
services, or any other thing or value " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp. 
2002). Also, the value of these items must be more than $5,000 to support a second-
degree felony conviction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (3)(d) (Supp. 2002). However, 
these elements are inconsequential because, under the greater-lesser test, the greater crime 
may have more elements then the lesser crime. It is only the lesser crime that must be 
completely immersed in the greater. Ross. 951 P.2d at 241. And that is the case between 
the lesser crime of forgery and the greater crime of identity fraud. 
Several cases support this. For instance, recently, in State v. Ross, this Court found 
that a greater-lesser relationship existed between some variations of forgery and 
communications fraud. Ross. 951 P.2d at 241. In that case, this Court pointed out that the 
elements of communications fraud were: 
(1) devising a scheme or artifice to defraud another; 
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(2) and communicating directly or indirectly with any person for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice; 
(3) when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained exceeds $5,000. 
Id. at 241-42. These elements, this Court held, include all of the elements of forgery in 
some circumstances. Id at 242. Also, in Ross the same act supported both forgery and 
communications fraud. IcL at 242-44. And so, the forgery conviction was vacated. Id. at 
246. 
This case is remarkably similar. The crime of communications fraud, which had a 
greater-lesser relationship with forgery in Ross, is similar to the crime of identity fraud in 
this case. Both involve the use of deception to obtain goods or services of value. Also, 
both punish the activity even if it is simply attempted, but not completed. Further, both 
deal with fraudulently obtaining goods or services valued at over $5,000. The only 
substantial difference between the crimes of communications fraud and identity fraud is 
that identity fraud requires the use of another's personal information, and 
communications fraud merely requires communicating to another person to execute or 
conceal the fraud. Otherwise, the crimes are identical. 
What is more, the crime of identity fraud is actually more like forgery then the 
crime of communications fraud. This is because forgery requires the actor to issue or utter 
a writing purporting to be that of another, and this inevitably requires the use of another's 
personal information. And, that is precisely what is prohibited under the identity fraud 
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statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2) (Supp. 2002). On the other hand, the 
communications fraud statute does not address this. 
In short, this Court's holding that there is a greater-lesser relationship between 
forgery and communications fraud supports the argument that the same relationship exists 
between forgery and identity fraud. Most importantly, however, a comparison of the 
elements of forgery and identity fraud compel the conclusion that the greater-lesser 
relationship exists, and that forgery merges into identity fraud. 
Now, turning to the relationship between forgery and theft by deception, a 
comparison of the elements of these two crimes shows that there is a greater-lesser 
relationship. The elements of forgery are entirely included in theft by deception. 
Again, the elements of forgery are: 
(1) intentionally or knowingly; 
(2) issuing or uttering a writing; 
(3) purporting to be the act of another; 
(4) with purpose to defraud. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). The non-statutory elements erroneously added by the 
trial court are: 
(5) the writing or utterance must not have been the act of the person whose name 
was forged. 
(6) the writing or utterance must not have been authorized. 
(7) the defendant must have known that his act was unauthorized. 
16 
R. 91. 
As with identity fraud, these elements, including those erroneously added by the 
trial court, are included in theft by deception. The elements of theft by deception are: 
(1) intentionally or knowingly; 
(2) obtaining or exercising control over the property of another; 
(3) by deception 
(4) with a purpose to deprive the other of the property; 
(5) when the value of the property exceeds $5,000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999); R. 80. 
As this shows, both forgery and theft by deception share the mental element of 
"intentionally or knowingly." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1) (1999). Also, both crimes 
require that the actor have a purpose to obtain something by trickery.13 Where theft by 
deception completely swallows forgery, however, is in the "by deception" element. The 
"by deception" element covers a wide range of activity, including such acts as: selling a 
cubic zirconium as a diamond;14 failing to secure insurance from a licensed company after 
13
 Specifically, forgery requires the actor to act "with purpose to defraud," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1) (1999), and theft by deception requires the actor to act "with a purpose to 
deprive" another of property by deception. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1) (1999). While there 
are some slight differences between the definitions of "defraud" and "deceit," those differences 
do not affect our comparison of the intent elements here. The principal idea behind these 
elements is that the actor act with purpose to obtain something by some form of trickery, and 
that brings the forgery statute into the scope of the theft by deception statute. 
A full analysis of the subtle differences between "defraud" and deceit" with regard to the 
actor's actual actions is found in the subsequent paragraphs. 
14
 State v. Taylor. 884 P.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
17 
collecting customers' premiums;15 making false representations about real security;16 and 
falsely inducing adoptive parents to pay birth-related bills.17 Also, the "by deception" 
element of theft-by-deception covers forgery in all its forms. 
This is shown by close examination of the "by deception" element. This Court's 
opinion in State v. LeFevre provides an excellent description of that element. In that case, 
this Court noted that there are three separate components of the "by deception" element. 
They are: 
(1) that defendant's acts satisfied the statutory definition of deception, (2) 
that the deception occurred contemporaneously with the transaction in 
question, and (3) that the victim relied upon the deception, at least to some 
extent, in parting with property. 
State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
These components completely encompass the crime of forgery. In fact, the first 
component alone encompasses the crime of forgery even without reference to the other 
components. Under the first component, the statutory definitions of "deception" are key. 
Here, the jury was given the following four statutory definitions: 
(a) [Deception c]reates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of 
law or fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that is false and that the 
actor previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
15
 State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 867 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
16
 State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Utah 1985). 
17
 State v. Vigil. 922 P.2d 15, 22-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be 
true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or . . . 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in 
the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the 
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise 
would not be performed.18 
These definitions cover forgery in all its forms. The different forms of forgery 
include: altering another's writing; uttering an altered writing; making, completing, 
executing, authenticating, issuing, transferring, publishing, or uttering any writing 
purporting to be the act of another; or representing any such thing as having been 
executed at a different time or place than is the case. None of these acts fall outside the 
statutory definitions of deception. This is shown by applying the definitions to the acts of 
forgery. 
First, forgery fits under "deception" definition (a). This is because the writings or 
utterances of forgery create impressions of fact that are false and that the forger knows to 
be false. And, such writings or utterances affect any related transactions.19 Second, under 
"deception" definition (b), the writings or utterances of forgery create false impressions 
18
 R. 81-82. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (5) (1999) (outlining five statutory 
definitions). Subsection (d) of this statute was excluded from the jury instructions here, R. 81, 
apparently because it deals with fraudulent sales and it does not apply here. 
19
 This part of the "deception" definition also takes into account the "purpose to defraud" 
element of forgery. 
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of fact designed to aid the forger in his purpose to defraud. Specifically, the forgery is 
designed to affect the judgment of another. This is because all acts that qualify as 
forgeries are done with an attempt to defraud. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). 
Third, forged writings or utterances, by design, prevent others from acquiring correct 
information about the writings or utterances. This is because the forged writing or 
utterance shrouds the forger's true identity or information, and prevents others from 
discovering this information without independent means. And, this likely affects any 
related transactions. Finally, forged writings or utterances purport to promise a 
performance that the forger does not intend to give. This is because forgery is 
characterized by a purpose to defraud. Id. 
All in all, forgery is nothing if not deception. The elements of forgery are 
completely immersed in the definitions of deception. Also, no form of forgery falls 
outside of these definitions. And so, even without reference to the other two components 
of the "by deception" element, forgery has a lesser-greater relationship with theft by 
deception. 
Nonetheless, the other two components of the "by deception" element encompass 
forgery. Under the second component of theft by deception, the deception must occur 
contemporaneously with the transaction at issue. LeFevre, 825 P.2d at 685. Forgery fits in 
easily here. Forgery, a form of deception, is always done with a purpose to defraud. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). So any writing or utterance is, of necessity, aimed at 
affecting any related transactions. Of course, it may be true that forgery occurs some time 
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before the related transaction. But this does not mean that the deception and transaction 
are not contemporaneous. This Court has already decided that. LeFevre, 825 P.2d at 686. 
As long as the affected party is being deceived at the time of the transaction, the 
deception and transaction are considered contemporaneous. Id. In this way, every case of 
forgery would fall within the contemporaneous component because a forger always acts 
to deceive someone during a transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). So, the 
second component of the "by deception" element encompasses forgery. 
The third component of the "by deception" element offers the most compelling 
reason for finding that forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception. Under 
that component, the victim must rely, at least to some extent, on a deception in parting 
with goods or services. Furthermore, both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
recognized that this component includes the means of deception, as well as the actual 
deception: 
[i]t is clear from the face of the [theft-by-deception] statute that reliance by 
the victim is an element of the crime of theft by deception. In context, 
obtaining property "by deception " can only mean "by means of 
deception. " Deception, followed by transfer of property to the deceiver, 
does not add up to theft by deception without the causal element of 
reliance.20 
In addition to this, this Court has explained that the reliance component of the "by 
deception" element focuses upon the effectiveness of the actual means used to deceive: 
The deceit must be "material" to constitute the offense, in the sense that it 
20
 LeFevre, 825 P.2d at 686-87 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263, 
1267 (Utah 1982)). 
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must be a significant factor in the transaction . . . . Materiality seems to 
require that the victim to some extent must believe the pretense to be true, 
but the greater focus is the objective issue of whether the misrepresentation 
was instrumental in effecting transfer of [property], 
14 at 687. 
Because of this, forgery cannot help but fall completely within the third 
component of the "by deception" element. Forgery is the deliberate issuance of a writing 
or uttering that purports to be that of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1) (1999). It is 
done without the other's authorization, R. 91, and it is done with a purpose to defraud. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1) (1999). It is, precisely, a material means of deceit. 
Indeed, it is so effective a means of deceit that criminal code writers have continually 
maintained that it constitutes a crime in itself, even if the objective of fraudulently 
obtaining property is not realized.21 In these circumstances, forgery must be considered a 
21
 The Utah Supreme Court has noted that, even though the theft and fraud statutes may 
be perfected to the point that forgery decreases in importance, it is still criminalized because of 
its strong capacity to create confusion: 
The drafters of the Model Penal code suggest that forgery arose as a separate 
branch of criminal law due to the shortcomings of other penal provisions. The 
drafters suggest that if these shortcomings are remedied in the area of fraud, 
attempt, complicity, and professional criminality, the need for a separate forgery 
offense is diminished. Nevertheless, forgery is "retained as a separate offense in 
the Model Code, in part because the concept is so embeded in statute and popular 
understanding that legislative abolition seems unlikely. Moreover, the special 
danger of forgery as a threat to public confidence in important symbols of 
commerce and as a means of perpetrating large-scale fraud is worth recognition. 
There is also the point that the offense of forgery should be drafted to redress 
injuries beyond those that would be occasioned by conduct amounting to theft. 
Whether for these reasons or others, in any event, the judgment to retain forgery 
as a separate offense has been universally accepted in modern criminal codes." 
State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,195 n.59 (Utah 1987) (quoting Model Penal Code § 224.1 
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lesser-included offense of theft by deception. 
This conclusion is further supported by the legal definitions of "deceit" found in 
authorities such as Black's Law Dictionary, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, and 
persuasive case law. To begin with, Black's Law Dictionary says that deceit is "[t]he act 
of intentionally giving a false impression " Black's Law Dictionary 413 (7th ed. 
1999). It is also "fraudulent misrepresentation," and, according to 
A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, it is "fraud" in some senses of that word. A 
Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 251 (2nd ed. 1995). "Fraudulent misrepresentation" is 
"[a] false statement that is known to be false . . . that is intended to induce a party to 
detrimentally rely on it." Black's Law Dictionarv 1016 (7th ed. 1999). "Fraud" has a 
number of meanings, but its primary meaning, and the one most applicable here, is "[a] 
knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce 
another to act to his or her detriment." Id at 670. 
All of these definitions encompass forgery. Indeed, these definitions specifically 
focus on the means of deceit as well as the state of being deceived. And forgery is a 
means of deceit. The forgery elements themselves, knowingly or intentionally making or 
uttering a writing, purporting to be the act of another, without the other's authorization, 
are all included in the primary definition of "deceit." And, while the element of acting 
"with a purpose to defraud" arguably falls outside of the general definition of deceit, this 
comment 2, at 284). 
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element is encompassed by the "purpose to deprive another of property" element of theft 
by deception. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (1999). So, forgery is completely included 
in theft by deception. 
Also, persuasive case law supports that forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft 
by deception. Most significantly, the Utah Supreme Court has already recognized that 
forgery is one step below theft. In State v. Frampton the Court noted that, under the 
Model Penal Code, forgery is actually treated as theft by deception when large amounts 
of money are involved: 
The offense [of forgery] is graded as a misdemeanor [under the Model 
Penal Code], although use of such a forgery in a scheme to defraud may 
well be treated as a felony under Section 223.3 [theft by deception] where 
significant amounts of money are involved. 
Frampton. 737 P.2d at 195. Further, the Court strongly implied that this makes forgery a 
lesser-included offense of crimes such as theft by deception: 
"The most serious instances of forgery will occur in connection with efforts 
to defraud, and it seems clear that a modern forgery provision should be 
drafted to avoid the imposition of penalties disproportionate to those 
authorized for fraud."22 
22
 Id at 196 (quoting the Model Penal Code). Frampton includes a short history of 
forgery and some interesting notations. For instance, the opinion indicates that forgery originally 
arose because of the shortcomings of the fraud, attempt, complicity, and professional criminality 
provisions. IdL at 195 n.59. And, even though those provisions and the theft provisions have been 
vastly improved, the forgery provisions remain to redress those wrongs that are beyond the scope 
of the theft statutes. Id. 
Of course, in Frampton the Utah Supreme Court was not examining the forgery and theft 
laws in connection with a merger issue. It was examining them in connection with an offense-
grading issue. Id. at 194-96. However, the research and holdings center around the relationship 
between forgery, fraud, and theft, and they are applicable here. 
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This supports that the crime of theft by deception inherently includes the crime of 
forgery, and that they have a greater-lesser relationship as a matter of law. 
Other jurisdictions have already recognized this greater-lesser relationship. The 
Kansas Court of Appeals has specifically found that, under its statutes, forgery is a lesser-
included offense of theft-by-deception in some circumstances.23 Additionally, the 
Washington Supreme Court,24 Ohio Court of Appeals,25 and Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals26 have found that forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft when the same 
facts support both charges. Beyond this, other courts, in different contexts, have noted 
the close relationship between forgery and theft.27 Because of this, and the fact that the 
Utah theft by deception statute entirely encompass forgery, forgery is a lesser-included 
offense of theft by deception. 
23
 State v. Perrv. 823 P.2d 804, 808 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). The elements of forgery and 
theft by deception in Kansas are largely similar to the elements of these crimes in Utah. Id. at 
807. However, the Kansas forgery statute requires proof that the perpetrator deliver a "written 
instrument which he knew had been forged" to the victim. Id. at 808. Because of this, the Kansas 
court found that forgery was not inevitably a lesser-included offense of theft-by-deception. But it 
was under the facts of that case. IdL 
The Utah statute does not have a delivery element. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1999) (lacking delivery as an essential element). 
24
 State v. Scobv. 810P.2d 1358, 1361 (Wash. 1991). 
25
 State v. Wolfe, 462 N.E.2d 455,457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). 
26
 Aucoinv. State. 548 So.2d 1053, 1058 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). 
27
 See State v. Gotti. 43 P.3d 812, 814-16 (Kan. 2002) (differentiating between forgery, 
theft by deception, and making a false writing requires close analysis); Com, v. Alexander. 722 
A.2d 698,700 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (in the area of forgery and theft by deception, the legislature 
may make specific directives concerning culpability for one or more counts). 
25 
To sum up, forgery is a lesser-included offense of both identity fraud 
and theft by deception. Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed they that could 
not convict Mr. Chukes of forgery unless they found him not-guilty of identity fraud and 
theft by deception. However, the jury was not given this instruction. Because of this, the 
forgery conviction should be vacated. 
B. The Elements of Identity Fraud are Included in Theft by Deception 
The identity fraud conviction, like the forgery conviction, should be vacated 
because identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of thefl by deception. This is 
demonstrated by a comparison of the identity fraud and theft by deception elements. 
First, the elements of identity fraud are: 
(1) knowingly or intentionally; 
(2) obtaining personal identifying information of another; 
(3) without the other's authorization; 
(4) and using or attempting to use that information, 
(5) with fraudulent intent, including obtaining or attempting to obtain credit, 
goods, services, or any other thing of value; 
(6) and the thing of value is or exceeds $5,000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002); R. 88. All of these elements are encompassed 
by the crime of theft-by-deception. Theft by deception is committed when a person: 
(1) knowingly or intentionally; 
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(2) obtains or exercises control over property of another; 
(3) by deception; 
(4) with a purpose to deprive the other of property; 
(5) and the value of the property is or exceeds $5,000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999). 
This comparison shows that some of the elements of the two crimes are identical. 
In particular, both crimes have the same mental intent of "knowingly or intentionally/' 
and both involve the objective of obtaining something worth $5,000 or more. Other than 
that, the elements of the two crimes are different. However, those elements of identity 
fraud that aren't identical to theft by deception are fully encompassed by theft by 
deception. And that is the hallmark of a greater-lesser relationship. 
To begin with, the identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying 
information of another, without the other's authorization" are encompassed by the "by 
deception" element of theft by deceiving. This is because the use of another's personal 
identifying information without their authorization is a means of deceiving another 
person. 
As has already been shown above, the "by deception" element consists of three 
separate components: the statutory definition of deception, the contemporaneousness of 
the deception and the transaction at issue, and the victim's reliance upon the deception in 
parting with property. LeFevre. 825 P.2d at 685. 
First, the identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information of 
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another, without the other's authorization" constitute deception under the first statutory 
definition of deception. This is because the identity fraud elements do precisely what is 
proscribed in the first "deception" definition: they "create or confirm" an impression of 
fact "that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (5) (1999); R. 
81. Indeed, creating a false impression of fact is precisely the point of using another's 
personal information to defraud. It is one of the many ways of deceiving another person 
to obtain services, goods, or something else of value. Therefore, the identity fraud 
elements of "obtaining personal identifying information of another, without the other's 
authorization" are encompassed in the first definition of "deception." 
The identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information of 
another, without the other's authorization" also fit under the other three statutory 
definitions of "deception" that were given to the jury.28 The identity fraud elements fit 
under the second definition of "deception" because using another's personal information 
without his authorization is creating "a false impression of.. . fact," as proscribed by the 
second definition. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40 l(5)(b) (1999). Also, as proscribed by the 
second definition, this false impression is not corrected because it is always created with 
the intention of gaining something of value.29 Further, when one person uses another's 
28
 See R. 80-81 (listing the statutory definitions of "deception" given to the jury). 
29
 One of the elements of identity fraud is that the information must be used, or attempted 
to be used, to obtain something of value. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2)(b) (Supp. 2002). 
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identifying information, any related transactions are likely to be affected. So, the identity 
fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information of another, without the 
other's authorization" are encompassed by the second definition of "deception." 
These identity fraud elements are also encompassed by the third definition of 
"deception." This is because the use of another's personal identifying information, 
without their permission, prevents the truth from coming to light. And, as proscribed by 
the third definition of "deception," this is likely to affect the outcome of related 
transactions. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (c) (1999). 
Finally, the identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information 
of another, without the other's authorization" are included within the fourth definition of 
"deception." This is because the use of another's identifying information in a transaction 
involves making promises which the maker does not intend to keep. And this, of course, 
affects the judgment of others involved in the transaction, as proscribed by the fourth 
definition of "deception." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40 l(5)(e) (1999). 
In short, the identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information 
of another, without the other's authorization" are completely included in the first 
component of the "by deception" element of theft by deception. 
The second component of the "by deception" element, contemporaneousness of 
the deception and transaction, also encompasses the identity fraud elements of "obtaining 
personal identifying information of another, without the other's authorization." This is 
because the perpetrator's purpose is to use the identifying information to deceive another 
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during a transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2)(b) (1999). And so the perpetrator 
must use the identifying information in a way that will enable him to obtain something of 
value. Put differently, the person who is being scammed must believe that the perpetrator 
is the person he purports to be, or else the scam will not work. And for that to happen, the 
perpetrator must obtain another's personal information and use it, or attempt to use it, in a 
way that will cause the victim to believe the perpetrator. This requires 
contemporaneousness of the deception and transaction. So, the second component of the 
"by deception" element completely encompasses the identity fraud elements of 
"obtaining personal identifying information of another, without the other's authorization." 
The third component of the "by deception" element focuses on the fact that the 
victim must rely on the perpetrator's deception in parting with goods or services. The 
component includes the means of deception as well as the actual reliance. LeFevre, 825 
P.2d at 686-87 (citing State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263,1267 (Utah 1982)). Because of this 
focus on the means of deception, "obtaining personal identifying information of another, 
without the other's authorization" falls completely under the third component. Using 
personal information without authorization is, doubtless, a means of deception designed 
to cause detrimental reliance. In fact, the very name of the crime "identity fraud" shows 
that the crime is a means of deceit covered by the theft by deception statute. 
Because of this, identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception in 
the same way that forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception. 
Fundamentally, identity fraud and forgery are both means of deception, and these crimes 
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are punishable even if the actual taking was not accomplished. This is because the means, 
forgery and identity fraud, are deemed so dishonest and potentially disruptive to our 
society that it warrants punishment whether it is successful or not.30 It follows, then, that a 
conviction under the forgery statute or identity fraud statute is completely appropriate 
when the taking was not actually accomplished. However, when the taking is 
accomplished, the crime becomes theft by deception. 
In short, the crime of identity fraud, particularly the elements of "obtaining 
another's personal identifying information, without authorization," is encompassed by the 
"by deception" element of theft by deception. 
The only remaining elements of identity fraud not accounted for are "using" the 
personal information of another "with fraudulent intent, including [obtaining or 
attempting] to obtain credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp. 2002). However, these elements are included in the theft 
by deception element of deceiving another "with a purpose to deprive [the other of 
property.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (1999). Indeed, the theft by deception element 
of deceiving another "with a purpose to deprive [the other of property]" is much broader 
than the identity fraud elements. With theft by deception, it must be proven that the 
defendant actually did obtain property or exercise control over it. On the other hand, 
30
 Neither the forgery nor the identity fraud statutes require that something of value 
actually be taken. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (the element of taking something of 
value, or some similar element, does not appear in the forgery statute); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
1102 (Supp. 2002) (perpetrator is punished for either using or attempting to use personal 
information of another to gain something of value). 
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identity fraud requires only that the defendant attempt to obtain something of value. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp. 2002). This shows that theft by deception not only 
encompasses identity fraud, it reaches beyond it. This is one of the hallmarks of the 
greater-lesser relationship, and it shows that this relationship exists between identity fraud 
and theft by deception. 
In sum, identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception as a matter 
of law. And, Mr. Chukes should not have been convicted of both crimes. Only his theft 
by deception conviction should remain standing. 
The greater-lesser relationships between forgery and identity fraud, forgery and 
theft by deception, and identity fraud and theft by deception are not the only reasons to 
vacate the forgery and identity fraud convictions. An equally compelling reason is that all 
three crimes are supported by the same evidence. Indeed, only one criminal act was 
committed. Because of that, only one count of the conviction, theft by deception, should 
stand. That argument is fully explored in the following subsection. 
C. The Evidence Supporting Forgery, Identity Fraud, and Theft bv 
Deception is the Same 
Under section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code, the second tier of the lesser-included 
offense analysis focuses on the facts proved at trial. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. Specifically, if 
the crimes at issue have multiple variations, it must be determined whether the greater-
lesser relationship actually exists between the variations of the crimes proved at trial. IdL 
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This tier of the lesser-included offense analysis evolved through a combination of 
constitutional interpretation and common law. Id However, it is also specified in section 
76-1-402. Under subsection (1) of 76-1-402, a defendant may not be punished multiple 
times for the same act: 
when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such 
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision 
bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999). Accordingly, if the same evidence supports a 
defendant's convictions, only one of the convictions may be affirmed. 
In this case, the crimes of forgery and identity fraud have multiple variations31 and 
they are supported by the same facts that support theft by deception. A review of the 
evidence shows this. 
The evidence supporting each element of theft by deception will be examined first 
31
 The variations of forgery are: altering any writing of another without his authority; 
uttering any such altered writing; making, completing, executing, authenticating, issuing, 
transferring, publishing, or uttering any writing so that it purports to be that of another; or 
purporting to have executed something at a time or place or in a different sequence than was 
really the case; or representing something to be a copy of something which does not exist. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). 
The variations of identity fraud are: obtaining the name or address or telephone number 
or driver's license number or social security number or place of employment or employee 
identification numbers or mother's maiden name or electronic identification numbers or digital 
signatures or any other personal information of another without the other's authorization, and 
using it with fraudulent intent. Alternatively, identity fraud is committed when someone attempts 
to use any of the above information with fraudulent intent. Additionally, the value of the targeted 
thing of value affects the degree of punishment associated for the crime. For instance, if the 
thing's value is or exceeds $5,000, identity fraud is a second-degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002). 
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because theft by deception is the encompassing crime in this case. The first element of 
theft by deception is the mental intent of "knowingly or intentionally" committing the 
crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1) (1999); R. 80. That intent is implied by the facts 
supporting the other elements. The second element is the act of "obtaining] or 
exercis[ing] control over the property of another " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1) 
(1999); R. 80. This is proven. On March 1, 2001, Mr. Chukes went to Crown Bedrooms 
in Murray, selected some bedroom furniture, applied for credit, and then came back later 
with a U-Haul to take the furniture away. R. 173 [37-38; 138]. Then he, along with 
others, loaded the furniture in the truck. Id. Finally, he drove away with the furniture and 
did not return it. Id This shows that he obtained and exercised control over the property 
of Crown Bedrooms. 
The third element of theft by deception is that the property must have been taken 
by means of deception. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1) (1999); R. 80. Mr. Chukes did 
this by pretending to be Mr. Mewbom. He used Mr. Mewborn's name, birthday, social 
security number, and driver's license. R. 173 [138]; Evid. Env. Ex. 2. He signed Mr. 
Mewborn's name to three documents necessary to obtain the furniture. The first 
document was the credit application, Evid. Env. Ex. 2, the second was the credit contract, 
Evid. Env. Ex. 1, and the third was the receipt for the furniture. Evid. Env. Ex. 3. And, he 
did all of this without authorization from Mr. Mewborn. Further, he did this with the 
intent to defraud. R. 173 [71-72]. 
Notably, all of this was necessary to complete the deception. Without obtaining 
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Mr. Mewborn's personal information, Mr. Chukes could not have pretended to be Mr. 
Mewborn when he applied for credit at the store. And, without filling out and signing the 
credit application, credit contract, and furniture receipt, Mr. Grimshaw would not have 
permitted Mr. Chukes to take the furniture.32 Finally, if he had done all of this with Mr. 
Mewborn's authorization, there would have been no deception. And so, all of this 
evidence is necessary to support the "by deception" element. 
The fourth element of theft by deception is that Mr. Chukes must have acted with a 
purpose to deprive Crown Bedrooms of the bedroom furniture. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
405 (1) (1999); R. 80. This is shown by the fact that Mr. Chukes came to get the furniture 
and took it away in a U-Haul. R. 173 [37-38,139]. He did not return it or pay for it. IcL 
This proves an intent to permanently deprive Crown Bedrooms of the furniture. 
The final element is that the furniture must have exceeded $5,000. This is proven 
by the credit contract and the furniture receipt, which both show the furniture cost 
$5,955.39. Evid. Env. Ex. 1 & 3. 
The most important thing to note about this evidence is that the facts supporting 
the "by deception" element are the same as those supporting the identity fraud and 
forgery counts. Indeed, the prosecutor himself explained that Mr. Chukes' use of Mr. 
32
 See IcL at 24-28; 30; Evid. Env. Ex. 1,2, & 3 (Crown Bedroom's procedure for 
obtaining financing requires the applicant to fill out an application with information such as his 
name, social security number, home phone number, driver's license number, address, previous 
address, present employer, position, income, mortgage information, and a reference telephone 
number. Then all of this is faxed in to American General, where a credit check is conducted. If 
the application is accepted, the store requires the customer to sign a credit contract, and receipt 
for furniture). 
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Mewborn's personal information, and the forgery of his name and information, supports 
the "by deception" element of theft by deception: 
the deception at issue in this case is the fact that the defendant represented 
himself as somebody he wasn't. He said he was Jeffrey Mewborn; he's not. 
He used Jeffrey Mewborn's name, he signed Jeffrey Mewborn's name, he 
used his identifying information like his birthday, Social Security card 
number and previous address when applying for the credit card. So that was 
the deception involved. 
R. 173 [138]. There is not anything about the identity fraud and forgery counts that 
reaches beyond this theft by deception evidence. All three counts are supported by Mr. 
Chukes' act of pretending to be someone else, on March 1, 2001, at the Crown Bedrooms 
store in Murray. R. 137 [137-142]. 
This is further supported by reviewing the prosecutor's arguments regarding the 
identity fraud and forgery counts. With regard to identity fraud, the prosecutor explained 
that this crime is supported by the fact that Mr. Chukes used Mr. Mewborn's name, birth 
date, social security number, and Georgia address in applying for credit at Crown 
Bedrooms. Id at 139-40. This was done with the intent of obtaining the furniture, which 
is a thing of value worth more than $5,000. Id. at 140. Additionally, it was also done 
without the authorization of Mr. Mewborn. Id. 
Ail of this, with the exception of the fact that the furniture was worth more than 
$5,000, is nothing more than the act of deception supporting the theft by deception 
charge. What is more, the furniture value does not differentiate the identity fraud facts 
from the theft by deception facts. This is because second-degree felony theft by 
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deception, like second-degree identity fraud, requires a property worth of $5,000 or more. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (l)(a)(i) (1999). And so, identity fraud is factually 
encompassed by theft by deception in this case. 
Now, it is true that Mr. Chukes' lack of authorization to use Mr. Mewborn's 
personal information was not specifically mentioned by the prosecutor in his summary of 
the evidence supporting theft by deception, R. 173 [137-39], but this lack of authorization 
was, nonetheless, necessary for the deception to work. If Mr. Mewborn had authorized 
the use of his information, there would have been no deception. Likewise, if Mr. Chukes 
did not know that Mr. Mewborn had not authorized the use of his information, there 
would have been no deception. The lack of authorization is a crucial part of the deception, 
and so it necessarily supports the theft by deception charge. The bottom line is that 
identity fraud is supported by exactly the same facts as theft by deception, and so the 
identity fraud conviction should be vacated. 
The same is true of the forgery charge. All of the evidence supporting the forgery 
charge supports the theft by deception charge. As the prosecutor explained, the evidence 
supporting the forgery charge is that Mr. Chukes filled out the credit application using 
Mr. Mewborn's personal information. R. 173 [141]. Then he signed the credit application 
using Mr. Mewborn's name. Id He also signed the credit contract and the receipt for the 
furniture. Id. Further, these acts were not authorized by Mr. Mewborn, and Mr. Chukes 
knew that they were not authorized. Id at 142. Finally, Mr. Chukes acted with the 
purpose to defraud. That is, he acted with the purpose of obtaining the furniture without 
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paying for it. Id 
There is nothing here that is not necessary to support the deception element of 
theft by deception. As with identity fraud, the only fact here that was not specifically 
mentioned by the prosecutor in his summary of support for the theft by deception charge 
is the fact that there was no authorization for the forgery. However, as explained above, 
this lack of authorization was necessary for the deception to exist. And so, as with 
identity fraud, forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception as a matter of fact 
in this case, and both the forgery and identity fraud convictions should be vacated. 
In sum, there are no independent facts to support forgery and identity fraud. Every 
fact supporting these charges is necessary to support the theft by deceiving charge. 
Without independent support, the forgery and identity fraud convictions fail, and should 
be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Chukes respectfully requests that this court vacate his 
convictions for forgery and identity fraud. Alternatively, Mr. Chukes requests that this 
court vacate his conviction for forgery. 
SUBMITTED this jj^ day of October, 2002. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
INCOURT NOTE 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 011913062 FS 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
Date: April 10, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: JOEY NATALE 
Defendant 
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : JOHN OCONNELL, JR. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of b i r t h : May 15 , 1964 
Tape Number: v i d e o Tape C o u n t : 2 . 3 1 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/30/2002 Guilty 
2. IDENTITY FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/30/2002 Guilty 
3. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/30/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of IDENTITY FRAUD a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 




Case No: 011913062 
Date: Apr 10, 2002 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT /CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison time to run concurrent to each charge, but consecutive to 
sentence in Idaho. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Commitment to begin forthwith. 
Charge # 1 




Charge # 3 
Total Fine: $10000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $4594.59 




Case No: 011913062 
Date: Apr 10, 2002 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
C/O defendant to pay '$500.00 recoupment fees and $$5,935.36 
restitution. Fines and restitution to be handled through Board of 
Page 3 (last) 17,^  
ADDENDUM B 
76-1-402 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
of a drunk driving charge under § 41-6-44 after 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 R2d 89 (Utah Ct. 
the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 
without a license, without a registration certifi- (Utah 1988); State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805 
cate and without a safety sticker, since the (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 
citations charge separate offenses entirely un- 1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 
related to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Lopez, 789 P2d 39 
253 (Utah 1980). (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P2d 896 (Utah 3 7 7 ( U t a h C t A™' 1 9 9 7 ) ' 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14. 
§ 20. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2. not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating 
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ADDENDUM C 
76-6-1002 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
PART 10 
MAIL BOX DAMAGE AND MAIL THEFT 
76-6-1002. Damage to mail receptacle — Penalties -
Greater offenses. 
(1) A person commits the crime of damage to a mail receptacle if the person 
knowingly damages the condition of a mail receptacle, including: 
(a) taking, concealing, damaging, or destroying a key; or 
(b) breaking open, tearing down, taking, damaging, or destroying a mail 
receptacle. 
(2) (a) In determining the degree of an offense committed under Subsection 
(1), the penalty levels in Subsection 76-6-106(3)(b) apply. 
(b) If the act committed amounts to an offense subject to a greater 
penalty, this subsection does not prohibit prosecution and sentencing for 
the more serious offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1002, enacted by L. ment, effective May 6, 2002, updated the statu-
1998, ch. 87, § 2; 2002, ch. 166, § 7. tory reference in Subsection (2)(a). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend-
PART 11 
IDENTITY FRAUD ACT 
76-6-1101. Identity fraud. 
This part is known as the "Identity Fraud Act." 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1101, enacted by L. came effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to 
2000, ch. 57, § 4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 57 be-
76-6-1102. Identity fraud crime. 




(c) telephone number; 
(d) driver's license number; 
(e) Social Security number; 
(f) place of employment; 
(g) employee identification numbers or other personal identification 
numbers; 
(h) mother's maiden name; 
(i) electronic identification numbers; 
(j) digital signatures or a private key; or 
(k) any other numbers or information that can be used to access a 
person's financial resources or medical information in the name of another 
person without the consent of that person except for numbers or informa-
tion that can be prosecuted as financial transaction card offenses under 
Sections 76-6-506 through 76-6-506.4. 
«89 OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-1103 
(2) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(a) obtains personal identifying information of another person without 
the authorization of that person; and 
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with fraudulent intent, 
including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, any other 
thing of value, or medical information in the name of another person 
without the consent of that person. 
(3) Identity fraud is: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the credit, goods, services, or 
any other thing of value is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor if: 
(i) a value cannot be determined and the personal identifying 
information has been used without the consent of that person to 
obtain medical information or to obtain employment; or 
(ii) the value of the credit, goods, services, or any other thing of 
value is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or any 
other thing of value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; or 
(d) a second degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or 
any other thing of value is or exceeds $5,000. 
(4) Multiple violations within a 90-day period may be aggregated into a 
single offense, and the degree of the offense is determined by the total value of 
all credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value used, or attempted to be 
used, through the multiple violations. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1102, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 57 be-
2000, ch. 57, § 5; 2002, ch. 122, § 3. came effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective May 6, 2002, added "or to obtain 
employment" in Subsection (3)(b)(i) and made a 
stylistic change. 
76-6-1103. Investigation, jurisdiction,, and prima facie 
evidence of violation. 
(1) In any criminal proceeding brought pursuant to this section, the crime 
shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which any part of 
the identity fraud took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever 
actually in that county 
(2) In addition to investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies, the 
Division of Consumer Protection also has responsibility for investigating 
violations of this part where identity fraud is the primary violation that is 
alleged to have been committed. 
(3) A criminal conviction under this part is prima facie evidence of a 
violation of Section 13-11-4, of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(4) Any violation of this part constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4, of the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1103, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 57 be-
2000, ch. 57, § 6; 2002, ch. 122, § 4. came effective on May 1. 2000, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
f ^ e fJ e c t?v e M a v 6> 2 0 0 2 » i n Subsection (2) Cross-References. — Division of Consumer 
aaaed the beginning of the sentence ending p r o t e c t ion, Title 13, Chapter 2. 
with agencies" and added the ending of the 
sentence beginning with "where identity 
fraud." 
ADDENDUM D 
76-6-413 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d (Utah 1987); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 
516 (Utah 1992). (Utah 1987); State v. Barher, 747 P.2d 436 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 
-.nor, ^ r> , -A* n o j n ,
 c / Tu u n .
 1 0 3 3
 < U t a h C t ' A PP' 1 9 9 2 ) > S t a t e V" D°v i s> 965 
^KtT L P f J k , n ^ 4 L R ! d ™ ^ h c ? c P-2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Cited in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 
985); State v. Parkin, 742 R2d 715 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 49. 
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 60(1). 
76-6-413. Release of fur-bearing animals — Penalty — 
Finding. 
(1) In any case not amounting to a felony of the second degree, any person 
who intentionally and without permission of the owner releases any fur-
bearing animal raised for commercial purposes is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
(2) The Legislature finds that the release of fur-bearing animals raised for 
commercial purposes subjects the animals to unnecessary suffering through 
deprivation of food and shelter and compromises their genetic integrity, 
thereby permanently depriving the owner of substantial value. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-413, enacted by L. came effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
1997, ch. 119, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 119 be-
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-501 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest m or claim against any person or enterprise 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, * 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 32, * 19; 
1975, ch. 52, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, * 15; 1996, 
ch. 205, * 27. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, incorporated 
former Subsection (3), which had set out the 
elements of second degree forgery, into Subsec 
tion (2), deleted "with a face amount of $100 or 
more" after "a check" m Subsection (2)(c), de 
leted "if the writing is or purports to be a check 
with a face amount of less than $100, all other 
forgery is a class A misdemeanor" from the end 
of Subsection (3) and made minor stylistic 
changes throughout the section 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, in Subsection (2) added 'electronic stor 
age or transmission' and substituted "valuable 
information including forms auch as" for "infor 
mation," making related stylistic changes 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Attempt 
Attorney signing client's name 
Authority to use forged signature 




Elements of offense 







False pretenses distinguished 
Fictitious name 
Indictment or information 
—Variance 
Intent 
Lesser included offense 





—Authority to sign another's name 
Standard of proof 





Where information charging offense of forg 
ery contained one count for forgery and another 
for uttering, attempt to utter could be shown, 
for it was immaterial that attempt to utter was 
unsuccessful, it was fact of uttering or attempt 
mg to utter that was of evidentiary value State 
v Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P2d 750 (1936) 
The crime of attempted forgery involves the 
same culpability and dishonesty as does the 
crime of forgery itself State v Ross 782 P 2d 
529 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
Attorney signing client's name. 
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attor-
ney to execute documents in the name of a 
client, does not authorize an attorney to forge a 
client's name to a negotiable instrument such 
as a settlement check and does not preclude the 
attorney's conviction for forgery as a matter of 
law when he doe > so, however, when an attor-
ney acts pursuant to the general authority 
granted by § 78 51-32 he may not later be 
convicted of forgery State v Musselman, 667 
P2d 1061 (Utah 1983) 
Authority to use forged signature. 
Where defendant forged his accomplice's 
name on checks which accomplice owned but 
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks 
and split the proceeds with the accomplice, 
defendant committed forgery as denned under 
Subsection (1Kb), notwithstanding that the ac-
complice authouzed defendant to sign his 
name State v Collins, 597 P2d 1317 (Utah 
1979) 
Computer crimes distinguished. 
The elements of the computer crimes statute, 
§ 76-6-703, are distinct from those of this sec-
tion, insurance fraud, § 76-6 521, and commu-
nications fraud, § 76 10 1801, and, thus, it was 
within the prosecutor's discretion to charge and 
the trial court's authority to sentence defen 
dant for computer crimes, rather than the 
crimes carrying lesser penalties State v Kent 
945 P2d 145 (Utah Ct App 1997) 
Defenses. 
—Insanity. 
Insanity, if sufficiently established, would 
261 
